Introduction
IPsec standard is one of widely deployed mechanisms for securing the network traffic -it is a suite of protocols, standards and rules ensuring data integrity, authenticity and confidentiality [1] , [2] . Process of securing network communication is computationally intensive and being handled by a network device can bring degradation to qualitative parameters of the network, mainly increase of delay and decrease of throughput [3] , [4] . It is also a big challenge to fulfil continuously heightening level of security when the amount of secured traffic is increasing concurrently. For this reason, it is important to examine the performance of security systems for various security configurations and types of traffic.
Specific property of securing process is that its throughput is dependent on size of the packet. The throughput cannot be expressed neither by a constant value of bits per second, nor by a constant value of packets per second over the whole range of packet sizes. On the contrary, over this range it will have non-constant and nonlinear trend, as is depicted in Fig. 1 . This is in contrast with performance of other common processes in packet networks, like bit rate of link interfaces or packet rate of switching and routing.
This introduces difficulties into modelling performance parameters of security systems when the value of service rate needs to be known, e.g. dimensioning throughput of mixed traffic comprising of more packet sizes, modelling a queuing delay or packet loss. In these cases, we need to know values of throughput for every packet size that is present in the traffic. In doing so, performing a lot of measurements could be rather time-consuming and inconvenient.
Aim of this paper is to propose a model of throughput of securing based on parameters independent on the packet size. The model should be valid for a wide range of IPsec system implementations and should provide reliable results without the need for detailed knowledge of the system internal architecture.
Model synthesis is based on the analysis of software and hardware components of the systemdetermined are operations that create potential bottleneck process in the system and consequently these operations are joined into groups according to their dependency on the packet size. As a result, throughput of securing process will be expressed by characteristic parameters that are independent on the packet size. This formulation further allows calculation of throughput for any packet size -a method for obtaining characteristic parameters will be proposed. Lastly, the model verification will be performed for various implementations of IPsec systems.
Although the paper focuses on IPsec, presented principles and methods are general and therefore should be applicable for any other security protocol.
Related Works and Motivation
Significant amount of works focused on examination of security system performance is dealing with experimental evaluation of the system performance. Authors rarely research possibilities of modelling or mathematical formulation of performance of security system. Authors in [5] present mathematical model of throughput of symmetric algorithms, where input variables are a number of instructions needed to encrypt one block of data and number of instructions executed in one processor clock cycle. In [6] authors study size overhead and processing overhead of IPsec, however, they consider only algorithmic time requirements, and not the time requirements of protocol processing that are constant for the packet of any size.
To our knowledge no literature provides analytical model of time requirements or throughput of entire IPsec process (or other security protocol) addressing its dependency on packet size, which is based on analysis of hardware and software components of the system.
In the field of security systems, many authors consider enhancing performance of the security system as one of the key tasks. The goal can be achieved either in a layer of hardware -especially working with configurable processors of type FPGA (Field-Programmable Gate Array), which can be programmed and optimized for execution of cryptographic algorithms, security protocol or both. Processors with configured logic provide higher performance than processors of general purpose [3] , [7] . Increase of performance can be achieved also by lowering communication overhead and better cooperation between components in a layer of software, which are represented mainly by device drivers, protocol stacks and cryptographic framework. Different implementations of one security protocol on the same device usually provide different performance [4] .
These are the main reasons of variability of different IPsec system solutions. A model proposed in this paper must therefore address this variability in order to be considered as general. 
IPsec System
In this section, analysis of hardware and software components of IPsec system is performed. Essential questions are -which operations form the IPsec process, which are potential bottleneck in the system, i.e. which are executed in serial and which in parallel, and how is each operation dependent on size of the packet.
Hardware Architecture
In Fig. 2 is shown general hardware architecture of IPsec system [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] . Most important components are: main processor (CPU), security processor, which is optional, main memory (also called system or kernel memory), L2 caches, network adapters, buses and direct communication channels.
In modern systems each processing unit access to the main memory through a direct communication channel called DMA (Direct Memory Access) when no control and management is required from the main processor. For instance, a network adapter moves the packet after its receiving on the interface "silently" to the main memory, in parallel to operations executed by the main processor, and then sends information to the main processor (interrupt request). Similarly, security processor reads and writes data to the main memory through its direct memory access without assistance of the main processor. Interrupt requests (IRQ) are asking the processor to interrupt current operation and execute operation of a higher priority. They are a common method to provide communication between independent processors operating in parallel, asynchronously. Information about finishing an operation or a request for a new operation is sent immediately without waiting. This approach lowers packet sojourn time in the system, but on the contrary it increases processing overhead by storing and restoring data from the interrupted process (context-switching).
Because the process of securing is computationally intensive, a separate security processor can be added to the system to increase performance of the system and to offload the main processor. Security processor is optimized for executing special operations, commonly for acceleration of cryptographic algorithms (in this case it is called cryptographic accelerator, which operates in look-aside mode), but also the whole protocol processing can be accelerated (then it is called security unit, which is more complex than accelerator and operates in flow-through mode). Usually, FPGA processors are employed as security processors because of their configurability and ease of optimization.
Placement of security processor within the device can be done either as a separate card connected via PCI bus, or as a processor embedded on the board, or as a part of SoC (System-on-a-chip), which composes of more processing cores.
Software Architecture
Software equipment is represented by an operating system, which includes implementation of the IPsec standard as well. Software determines how effectively will be resources provided by the hardware utilized. In Fig. 3 is shown general software architecture of a security system. This architecture follows the main concepts native for operating systems Linux 12 and BSD [13] , [14] and which consider also leading producers of security hardware and software (Intel [11] , Cavium [15] , Freescale [8] ). When speaking particularly of IPsec system, significant part of operations is executed in kernel-space. Only protocol IKE (Internet Key Exchange) is processed in user-space, however, it is executed only in a set-up phase of the connection and therefore it has no influence on the throughput. On the contrary, execution of other security protocols, e.g. SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security) and SRTP (Secure Realtime Transport Protocol) is performed in user-space.
1) IPsec Stack
In kernel-space are executed all protocol operations defined by IPsec standard for securing the traffic. The protocols are AH (Authentication Header) and ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload), i.e. the operations include a creation of protocol headers and entries and look-ups in databases SPD (Security Policy Database) and SAD (Security Association Database). Database SPD is used for determining whether the packet is IPsec or not, and if so, security configuration for the packet is looked-up in the SAD database. Both databases are part of the main memory.
Most important fact is that mentioned AH and ESP protocol operations do not work with packet payload at all. This means that time requirements of these operations are independent on the packet size.
2) Cryptographic Framework
Cryptographic framework makes cryptographic operations performed by cryptographic engine (either software or hardware) available to all components of the kernel-space, including IPsec stack. It defines two interfaces -first for access of the components to framework, second for access of the framework to cryptographic algorithms (Transform API and Algorithm API in Linux systems, Consumer API and Producers API in BSD systems). It further builds up the transformation configuration (fetches requests and creates their descriptors, creates pointers for payload, keys and configuration data) and calls driver of cryptographic engine.
In case the system is not equipped by separate hardware cryptographic engine (cryptographic accelerator), framework calls the algorithm from its own library using pseudo-driver cryptosoft. Comparing to driver of hardware engine pseudo-driver is very trivial and introduces low or even negligible processing overhead. In case that hardware cryptographic engine is present, the cryptographic operations are moved to the layer of hardware.
Based on description of operations of cryptographic framework we can conclude that they are independent on the size of the packet -they are not working with packet payload as was also the case of protocol operations.
3) Cryptographic Algorithms
Cryptographic algorithms transform plain-text payload to a cipher-text. They can either encrypt the payload to ensure data confidentiality, e.g. symmetric encryption algorithms 3DES or AES, or they can compute authenticated hash to ensure data integrity and authenticity, e.g. authentication algorithms MD5-HMAC or SHA-1-HMAC.
Most of the algorithms process the data in blocks of fixed size -padding is added if payload size is not a multiple integer of the block size. Encryption algorithms may work in various modes -either without feedback (ECB -Electronic Codebook), or with feedback between consecutive blocks (e.g. CBC -Cipher-Block Chaining, CFB -Cipher Feedback Mode). Most important note is that in every mode the data are processed without a nonlinear feedback, i.e. feedback modes reflect only preceding block of data. This means that time requirements of raw cryptographic operations are dependent on packet size and are directly proportional to number of blocks in the packet.
Another note is that entire algorithmic processing composes besides mentioned cryptographic operations also from a small overhead introduced by algorithm initialization -mainly derivation of round keys from the main key. Time requirement of this overhead is for every packet the same -it does not depend on the number of blocks in the packet.
4) Modes of Operation
The main processor and cryptographic engine cooperate in one of two modes. Mode of operation has a decisive impact for defining operations which create the bottleneck process. The mode indicates whether cryptographic engine operates towards the main processor in serial (synchronous mode) or in parallel (asynchronous mode).
Synchronous mode of operation -in this mode the main processor has to wait until algorithm is finished. In case that cryptographic engine is only software implementation, i.e. algorithm is executed by the main processor, synchronous mode is the only possible mode. If cryptographic engine is a separate hardware processor, this mode may, however, lower potential performance of the system. The main processor waits idly until algorithm is finished and is blocked for any other process. On the other hand, synchronous mode of operation introduces lower communication overhead between processing units, i.e. driver of cryptographic engine is simpler and interrupt requests are not raised. Synchronous mode of operation is more likely to be found in the security system implementations [4] -it is employed if:
 the device is not equipped by hardware cryptographic engine (cryptographic operations are executed by the main processor),  hardware cryptographic engine is incapable of the asynchronous operation (lower-end devices),  cryptographic framework is not capable of the asynchronous operation (native cryptographic framework in Linux, called Cryptographic API),  hardware cryptographic engine is not supported by the cryptographic framework (driver is missing),  synchronous mode is chosen administratively (if communication overhead is greater than benefits introduced by asynchronous mode).
Asynchronous mode of operation -this mode is suitable only for a system equipped by a hardware cryptographic engine. The main processor requests engine to perform cryptographic operations. Employing call-back function it does not wait for their finishing, however, it returns for executing its own protocol operations. Cryptographic engine and the main processor are able to operate in parallel, then. The bottleneck process will be one of two separate processes. As this form of communication is more complex, communication overhead is also higher than in synchronous mode (interrupt requests are present). Asynchronous mode of operation is employed only if both cryptographic framework and cryptographic engine support it and if choice of this mode is advantageous.
Summary
Based on the preceding analysis of hardware and software components of IPsec system, we can deduce that the only determinant factor in formulating throughput of IPsec system will be the mode of operation. All other possibilities for enhancing the system performance will be in lowering communication overhead, i.e. lowering amount of transferred control and configuration data, in efficient entries into memories and in acceleration of cryptographic algorithms. The enhancements would lead into lower time requirements of the particular operation, but would not eliminate the operation entirely.
Model of IPsec Process Throughput
In order to delimit the operations that cause the bottleneck process we take a look at a chain of operations that packet undergoes when it passes through the system. Presented operation chain follows principles of operation systems Linux and BSD, and also principles presented by several vendors, e.g. Freescale [16] , Intel [17] , Elliptic [18] , Cisco [19] and Mikrotik [20] .
Synchronous Mode of Operation
In Fig. 4 is shown chain of operations for synchronous mode of operation. Description of these operations is following:
1. Processing begins after receiving a frame on the network interface. Network adapter, which operates towards the main processor asynchronously as a separate processing unit, checks the frame for errors, executes operations of the data link layer, removes the frame header and transfers a packet to the main memory (RX Ring Buffer) via DMA. All these operations are performed independently on the main processor (i.e. in parallel), so they do not participate on the potential bottleneck process.
2. When the transfer of the packet to memory is finished, network adapter sends to the main processor interrupt request (IRQ), which must be served immediately. Processor launches interrupt handler or interrupt service routine (ISR), which is actually a network adapter driver that fetches information about received packet. It schedules also SoftIRQ program in which protocol operations are executed.
3. Packet header may be stored in L2 cache of the main processor what speeds up its processing. It is checked for errors and against the SPD to determine whether the packet falls into IPsec policy.
4. If packet falls into IPsec policy, security configuration in SAD is looked up.
5. If ESP protocol is used, ESP trailer containing padding bits is added to the packet.
6. Cryptographic framework is launched. It is responsible for building up transformation configuration, i.e. fetching requests, creating their descriptors and creating pointers for payload, keys and configuration data.
7. This information is sent to cryptographic engine using the driver. If cryptographic engine is a software implementation, the driver is very trivial.
8. Cryptographic engine reads transformation configuration from the main memory. If round cryptographic algorithm is used, round keys are derived from the main key.
9. Cryptographic engine reads plain-text data assigned for securing from the main memory.
10. Cryptographic operations are performed.
11. Cipher-text is written to the main memory.
12. The main processor finishes protocol processing of the packet, i.e. adds AH and/or ESP header.
13. In case of IPsec tunnel mode, a new IP header is created.
14. The rest of operations of the network layer is performed, e.g. routing, QoS policy, etc.
15. Information about placement of the packet in memory and request for its transmission is sent do the network adapter.
16. Network adapter creates frame header and transmits the frame.
When speaking of process as a set of operations executed by one or more processors in a synchronous manner it is evident that process of securing consists of all operations described above except from the ones executed by the network adapter. We can divide these operations of securing process according to their dependency on the packet size into two groups:
1. Time requirements of operations of the first type are independent on the packet size. In Fig. 4 , these are operations with orange background. They are aforementioned operations of protocol stacks, i.e. manipulation with headers and databases look-ups, building up transformation configurations, executing drivers and deriving round keys. These operations do not work with packet payload at all. Computational rate of these operations could be expressed in packets per second independently on the packet size. Now, we join these operations into one subprocess. Its time requirements will be expressed as 2. On the contrary, time requirements of the second type operations are dependent on the packet sizethey are directly proportional to the number of algorithmic data blocks in the packet. In Fig. 4 , they are the ones with purple background. Except from the raw cryptographic operations also read/write operations of plain-text/cipher-text from and to the main memory belong here.
Computational rate of these operations can be expressed by a constant bit rate independent on the packet size. We join these operations in one subprocess. Its time requirements will be expressed as
where is the size of secured data, is bit rate of the sub-process, is bit rate of raw cryptographic operations and is bit rate of read/write operations of plain-text/cipher-text. Since both sub-processes are synchronous, time requirements of the whole process of securing will be the sum of time requirements of individual sub-processes, i.e.
Throughput of securing process will be inversed value of its time requirements, i.e. 1/ s S R  t packets per second.
From aforementioned relation, it is evident why throughput of securing cannot be expressed neither by a constant bit rate, nor a constant packet rate over the whole range of packet sizes. However, parameters fix t and describe the process of securing comprehensively over the whole range of packet sizes independently from the packet size, and therefore we name them characteristic parameters of securing process.
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Asynchronous Mode of Operation
In Fig. 5 is shown chain of operations for asynchronous mode of operation. Description of these operations is the same as in the previous case. The difference is in parallelism of operation of the main processor and the cryptographic engine. As a consequence, bottleneck process may arise from one of two processes -either protocol, framework and driver operations executed by the main processor, or communication and algorithmic operations executed by the cryptographic engine, depending on which one has the higher time requirements. Time requirements of securing process in the system with asynchronous mode of operation will be then max ,
where fix t are the time requirements of operations executed by the main processor, is communication and key derivation overhead performed by cryptographic engine (operations 8 and 12 in Fig. 5 
Size of Secured Data
IPsec in tunnel mode secures entire original IP packet [21] , [22] . In rough calculations can be considered as size of the original IP packet. In precise calculations will be calculated using following formulas. Size of secured data for AH authentication will be
where Size of secured data for ESP encryption will be following:
where L is the size of the original IP packet and is the block size of the algorithm. 
Summary
Based on performed analysis, we can suppose that various implementations of IPsec system introduce only variability in relative significance of proposed characteristic parameters, and do not mean elimination or addition of a new parameter. The only determinant factor in formulating throughput will be the mode of operation. Proposed model shall be then valid for any implementation of IPsec system. The validation for various implementations is presented in the Section 7 of this paper.
A Method for Obtaining Characteristic Parameters
In this section, a method for obtaining characteristic parameters will be presented. The method presumes that securing process is the bottleneck process in the system.
In such case throughput of securing process  
what is the time required to process one packet of size L M by the bottleneck process   S t as well as the time interval between arrivals of two packets at the recipient's site   M t . We assume that no packet loss is caused by a random overflow of the packet buffer.
Aforementioned relation means that characteristics of securing process given by parameters fix t and (3), eventually also by (4), will be "mirrored" into the measured throughput. Measured throughput will therefore provide enough information to evaluate the characteristic parameters. 
Solving the system we get expressions of the characteristic parameters:
Thereafter we are able to calculate estimated throughput for any size of packet by a relation
where is size of secured data in this packet.
alg L
As can be seen, besides the possibility of estimating throughput we get also information about two sub-process in the securing process that are described by values fix alg R t and .
Asynchronous Mode of Operation
Similar assumptions and principles as in the previous case are standing also for asynchronous mode. The difference is that securing process is divided into two separate independent processes whereas only one of them becomes a bottleneck process for a particular packet size.
If time requirements of operations executed by the main processor are higher than requirements of operations executed by the cryptographic engine, then throughput of the system will be given by a relation
where is the packet size, which is the throughput calculated for and Contrary, if time requirements of operations executed by the cryptographic engine are higher, then throughput of the system will be given by a relation
which is derived from the system of two equations in two unknowns in the same manner as it being in case of synchronous operations, but instead parameter fix t here appears parameter (see Fig. 5 ).
oh t
We will suppose that throughput of securing process will be given by (13) for the small packets and by (14) for the large packets. In such case, three measurements of throughput are necessary. First measurement will be performed for a small packet to obtain parameter fix t , two other measurements will be performed for the large packets to obtain parameters and . Correctness of the last two measurements will be verified so that these values have to be different from values calculated by (13) .
Throughput breakpoint, i.e. packet size when both processes require the same amount of time, can be derived from equality of (13) and (14), i.e.:
Compacted expression of throughput of securing process over the whole range of packet sizes for asynchronous mode of operation will be then 
Usage of the Method
Usage of the method eliminates the need for performing a lot of measurements in order to create throughput profile for the whole range of packet sizes. For instance, document RFC 2544 recommends performing measurements for packet sizes of 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, 1280 and 1420 bytes. Moreover, in modelling performance of security system we need to know throughput values for each packet size that is present in the traffic. The measurements can be rather timeconsuming as one measurement can last several minutes using UDP iterative search technique recommended in RFC 2889. Proposed method can be used also in a situation when we cannot perform any measurement, but we know throughput values for two different packet sizes, for instance from a technical specification of the device. For these reasons, characteristic parameters could be practically used for comprehensive and convenient definition of securing process throughput on any security system.
Experimental Verification
Experimental verification was performed on a test-bed illustrated in In Tab. 1 are listed calculated values of fix t and for various security combinations using (10) and (11) Symbol "x" denotes control measurements. Saw-tooth pattern in case of authentication algorithms is caused by alignment of data on a multiple integer of block size, which is 512 bits. In case of encryption algorithms the block size is smaller, usually 64 or 128 bits.
Model Verification Using Available Data from Other System Implementations
In this section, the model and method for throughput calculation for any packet size is verified using available data from other IPsec systems. This set of data represents certain variability between the system implementations.
In Tab. 3 -Tab. 8 are confronted measured (referenced) and calculated values of the throughput. Values that are input to the calculations are denoted with an asterisk. Besides presented examples, data from other implementations can be found in [26] , [27] , [28] .
Verification has shown that proposed model and method are valid for a wide spectrum of security system implementations. The inaccuracy of calculation is keeping below 2 % in most cases.
Implementation 1
Intel corporation in [11] 
Implementation 2
Authors in [24] tested performance of IPsec with encryption algorithm AES in GCM mode (Galois Counter Mode), which data first encrypts and then authenticates. Algorithm is based on AES-NI (AES New Instruction set), which was introduced in 2010 by Intel. System is without hardware accelerator, operation system is Linux with kernel 2.6.31, security configuration is ESPaes_ni_gcm. Comparison of referenced and calculated values is presented in Tab. 4.
Implementation 3
Authors in [3] 
Implementation 4
Authors in [23] tested performance of IPsec on a multicore system using pcrypt IPsec for Linux, which utilizes the cores in parallel. Security configuration is ESPaes192/ESP-sha1. Comparison of referenced and calculated values is presented in Tab. 6.
Implementation 5
Freescale in [4] 
Implementation 6
As was mentioned in the beginning of the paper, analysis and principles presented for IPsec should hold analogically also for the other security protocols.
Author in [25] A method for obtaining characteristic parameters was derived from the general throughput model. Usage of the method eliminates the need for performing many measurements for building the throughput profile over the whole range of packet sizes. The measurements can be rather time-consuming as one measurement can last several minutes using UDP iterative search technique. Characteristic parameters therefore might be practically used for comprehensive and convenient definition of securing process throughput on any security system. Validation of the model was performed using data from various security system implementations -it provides results with an error below 2 % from the actual measured value in most cases.
The model and the method might be further used for a throughput calculation when more packet sizes are present in a mixed traffic and might be used as an input to a queuing model describing the security gateway where the service rate needs to be known.
